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Times. This article is based on Perry Link and Xiao Qiang, “From Grass-
Mud Equestrians to Rights-Conscious Citizens: Language and Thought 
on the Chinese Internet,” in Restless China, edited by Perry Link, Richard 
Madsen, and Paul G. Pickowicz (Rowman & Littlefield, 2013).
Of all the transformations that Chinese society has undergone over the 
past fifteen years, the most dramatic has been the growth of the Internet. 
Information now circulates and public opinions are now expressed on 
electronic bulletin boards with nationwide reach such as Tianya Club 
(since 1999); blog-hosting portals such as Sina.com (since 2007); and 
microblogging services such as Sina Weibo (since 2010). According to a 
September 2012 report by the official China Internet Network Informa-
tion Center, Internet users in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) now 
number 538 million out of a total national population of about 1.3 bil-
lion. Sina Weibo has announced that its registered-user accounts reached 
386 million in August 2012. The rise of such online platforms has given 
Chinese “netizens” an unprecedented capacity for self-publishing and 
communication, albeit within a heavily censored environment. The in-
stantaneous, interactive, and relatively low-risk nature of blogging has 
empowered netizens to voice political opinions, form social connections, 
and coordinate online (and sometimes offline) collective actions. 
Nevertheless, Chinese netizens are still speaking in a heavily monitored 
environment, and so their demands for greater freedom of information and 
expression often find voice through coded language and metaphors that 
allow them to avoid outright censorship. The government’s pervasive and 
intrusive censorship system has generated equally massive resentment 
among Chinese netizens. The Internet has become a quasi-public space 
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where the dominance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is con-
stantly being exposed, ridiculed, and criticized by waves of jokes, videos, 
songs, poems, jingles, fiction, sci-fi, code words, satire, and euphemisms. 
As a result, Chinese cyberspace has seen the emergence of a new political 
discourse.1 Largely invented by young gadflies, a surprising number of 
these terms have begun to spread widely. Liberals, ultranationalists, and 
even the People’s Daily (the CCP’s official newspaper) have used them. 
Will a new political discourse give birth to a new political identity? 
Old CCP assumptions about linguistic ritual as a tool to forge conformi-
ty remain in place. People are still trained to believe, for example, that 
dang (party) and guo (nation) are inseparable, or at least close enough 
that aiguo (patriotism) and ai dang (love of the party) need not be distin-
guished. In official language, wodang or “our party” implies “the party 
of everyone.” This makes it especially significant that, in today’s Inter-
net lingo, terms such as guidang ([your] honorable party) are beginning 
to be used in ways that put sarcastic distance between the speaker and 
the Party. As this kind of usage spreads, it begins to raise questions of 
national identity. If netizens are rejecting “party equals country,” what 
are they putting in its place? What does it mean today to be “Chinese”? 
One reason why citizen inroads have reached further on the Internet than 
in other media is that linguistic innovations have helped the Internet to seem 
like a new, open realm. All human languages constantly evolve, of course, 
and in principle there is nothing “new” in having new terms appear on the 
Chinese Internet. But their production and spread there has been especially 
rapid. Some of the new terms grow from temporary code words that neti-
zens have used in order to evade word filters. The term zhengfu (govern-
ment), for example, counts as “sensitive,” and efforts to skirt it have given 
rise to a number of new terms. One of these is tianchao (heavenly dynasty), 
which, besides avoiding filters, delivers the mischievous suggestion that 
the government is hardly modern. In a nod to George Orwell, the CCP’s 
Department of Propaganda is referred to as the zhenlibu (Ministry of Truth). 
One of the most famous Internet puns has to do with a character called 
the cao ni ma or Grass Mud Horse. The term literally contains those three 
words—there are Grass Mud Horse comics, videos, and stuffed animals 
that bring the character to life. The joke is that with only a shift of tone the 
words can easily be made to sound very much like a certain highly pro-
vocative and insulting profanity. Playful images of the Grass Mud Horse 
are novelties that circulate within the relatively small circles of people 
who enjoy such things. But the term cao ni ma as a spoken word has a 
much broader range and reaches many more people both on and off the 
Internet. In a famous photograph, the artist Ai Weiwei leaps into the air, 
naked except for a stuffed-animal Grass Mud Horse held over the middle 
of his body at crotch level in order to block his genitals from view. The 
photo is a jab at the CCP regime, for the expression “the Grass Mud Horse 
covers the middle” can mean, with a shift of tone, “f___ your mother, 
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Communist Party Central Committee.” The elegance of Ai’s art is that he 
can induce viewers to think that second phrase without uttering a single 
syllable. To the regime’s Internet police he can say, “You said it, not me!” 
Another widespread term is hexie, which means “river crab” but is 
a near-homonym of the word for “harmony.” The regime of recently 
retired PRC president Hu Jintao, in its public rhetoric, put great stress 
on the idea of a hexie shehui or “harmonious society.” By recasting this 
official phrase to turn “harmonious society” into “river-crab society,” 
netizens are evoking Chinese folklore, in which the crab appears as a 
bully known for scuttling sideways. Netizens also use hexie as a verb as 
well as a noun. When a website is shut down or a computer screen goes 
blank, the victims might say “We have been river-crabbed!” or, in other 
words, “harmonized” into silence. 
Does New Language Lead to New Thought? 
In recent years, Chinese netizens have shown that they possess bound-
less creativity and ingenuity in finding such ways to express themselves 
despite stifling government restrictions on online speech. Scholars and 
China watchers have argued about whether or not Internet repartee is a 
mere safety valve. By giving people a way to blow off steam, does it ul-
timately reinforce the status quo? Sometimes resistance does seem little 
more than a fun game: Reports from the official Xinhua News Agency 
will not say what really happened? Alright, we will. You close us down 
for doing so? No problem, we will jump around online and find another 
way. You keep doing it? Very well, we will lampoon you as a bunch of 
crotchety river crabs. The “safety-valve” theory holds that this kind of 
resistance, which is almost recreational, may be cathartic but hardly af-
fects the way people think and behave in the offline world.
But others have argued that Internet sarcasm has deeper effects. Once 
it catches on, they say, it tends to spread. Satire of things such as bul-
lying and corruption naturally extends just as far as the problems them-
selves extend—which is very far indeed, potentially into every corner of 
society. There, in those myriad corners, satire can begin to rot the foun-
dation on which bullying and corruption rest, and “prepare the ground” 
for more significant change. One can even hope that regime change, 
when it eventually arrives, will be more likely to be peaceful than vio-
lent insofar as the ground for it has been softened. 
An important shift takes place when sarcastic terms spread into gen-
eral use: They come increasingly to lose their sarcastic bite and to seem 
just like normal terms. Talk of the CCP regime as the tianchao or “heav-
enly dynasty” began as barbed mockery, but once it spread and became 
standard, the sarcasm drained away and it turned simply into a way of 
saying “government.” Similarly, the use of pimin (fart people) began as 
a bitter suggestion that powerholders see rank-and-file citizens as hav-
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ing no more value than digestive gas. Now it is just another way to say 
laobaixing (ordinary folks). But the seemingly innocuous process by 
which sarcastic terms are normalized can have profound consequences. 
It converts the terms from the relatively narrow role of expressing resis-
tance to the much broader one of conceiving how the world normally is. 
When tianchao is used specifically as a jab at the regime, it is a tool with 
a purpose and can be countered with a return jab. But when it reflects 
and expresses normality, much more is at stake. The question of an al-
ternative worldview and new political identity emerges. 
Worldviews that differ from the official one are not new in the PRC. 
They certainly preceded the Internet. In the past, though, such views 
were almost entirely confined to private spaces—either to the privacy 
of individual minds or to small groups that were beyond public earshot. 
People who share alternative worldviews have not been allowed to hold 
public assemblies. Internet language, however, has nurtured new sub-
cultures in which style and camaraderie have become values in their 
own right, and in which “cyber-assemblies” have emerged. Through 
online consultation, they can do many of the things that physical as-
semblies do in a free society: debate issues, argue over the wording 
of petitions and manifestoes, sign statements, vote in polls, and bring 
public pressure to bear on specific issues—all while each member sits 
separately in front of his or her computer screen. 
Cyber-meetings resemble physical meetings in some ways that have 
politically important implications. They are, first of all, autonomous as-
semblies that usually originate from the bottom up. Consider an exam-
ple. On 23 June 2011, netizens came across Weibo postings by an attrac-
tive twenty-year-old woman named Guo Meimei. Even as she flaunted 
her ownership of pricey handbags and cars (including a Lamborghini 
and a Maserati), Guo claimed to be a “commercial general manager” at 
the Red Cross Society of China (described by the New York Times on 
3 July 2011 as “a government organization that is the country’s largest 
charity”). After this netizen-discovered story went viral on the Inter-
net, China’s official media began to discuss it too, and eventually it 
reached even the international media. Netizens not only broke the story 
but drove the public’s opinion of it. Online “assemblies” large and small 
denounced Guo, excoriated the Chinese Red Cross (which watched its 
donations plummet despite denying any link to her), raised suspicions 
about the entire world of philanthropy in China, and eventually decried 
the general decline in ethics across Chinese society as a whole.2 The 
Guo Meimei case faded out almost as quickly as it flared up, so it is 
hard to say that it has left behind any enduring instance of “cyber-orga-
nization.” In other cases, though, it is clear that online campaigns have 
indeed given birth to organizations. They have survived the issues that 
originally brought them together and have sometimes led to action “in 
real life” (or IRL, as the Internet acronym puts it).  
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In addition to forging some new group identities, Internet culture has 
subjected national identity to reimagination. What does it mean to be 
Chinese today, and how does netizen culture affect the question? The 
CCP has always offered a ready answer to the question of Chinese iden-
tity, and has stressed it in the schools and the media: To be Chinese is to 
stand with the Chinese Communist Party. To depart from the Party is to 
be not only politically incorrect but un-Chinese. 
On the Internet, however, these axioms are being drawn into question, 
and alternative answers to the national-identity question are beginning 
to appear. A few years ago, a netizen with a sly sense of humor began 
using the terms guidang (your [honorable] party) and guiguo (your [hon-
orable] state). Gui literally means “noble” or “expensive” and has long 
been placed before nouns as a polite way of saying “your”: Thus guixing 
means “your honorable surname,” and so on. Guiguo has also, for a long 
time, been an established way of saying “your country” when people from 
different countries are talking to each other in a formal way. But now, in 
some circles on the Internet, guiguo has taken on the sarcastic meaning 
of “your state”—in other words, the state that belongs to you rulers, not 
to me. The question “What is guiguo?” has popped up in Internet chat 
rooms. In one of these, in October 2010, a netizen wrote: “It turns out that 
this guo is not our guo, but the guo of a certain dang [that is, the Commu-
nist Party]. This fact makes the terms guiguo and guidang appropriate.” 
What Is It to Be Chinese?
But if netizens are putting ironic distance between themselves and 
“your state,” the question arises of what they do identify with at the 
national level. What is it, in the new day, to be Chinese? This is a big 
question, and the answers that are beginning to appear are only tentative. 
Consider pimin or “fart people,” the playful tag that has come to stand 
in opposition to guiguo. The pimin usage originated from a notorious in-
cident that took place on 29 October 2008, when Lin Jiaxiang, a 58-year-
old Communist Party official, was eating and drinking at a seafood res-
taurant in Shenzhen City, near Hong Kong. He asked an 11-year-old girl 
for directions to the men’s room, then told her to lead him to it person-
ally. Once there, he grabbed her and tried to force her inside. She escaped 
and ran to her parents. Her father confronted the would-be molester and 
an argument ensued, during which Lin pointed at the father and yelled, “I 
was sent here by the Ministry of Transportation! My rank is the same as 
your mayor’s! You people are farts to me! You wanna take me on?! You 
wanna test what I can do to you?!” 
Unfortunately for Lin, the entire episode was captured by a security cam-
era and leaked to the Internet, where it went viral.3 Lin eventually was fired 
and “fart people” became a standard term. Gradually it morphed into a term 
of pride. Fart people came to mean “us” netizens and ordinary people, the 
84 Journal of Democracy
ones on the receiving end of abuse, the ones who have no vote, the ones who 
empathize and identify with one another—the ones who, in short, form the 
polar opposite of guiguo, the country of Lin Jiaxiang and his entitled ilk. 
The imbalance in power between guiguo and pimin is sometimes high-
lighted by the satiric use of bei, which originally meant “quilt” or, as a 
verb, “to cover,” but about a century ago became a grammatical device 
used for translating the passive voice in Western languages. Using bei, 
an English phrase such as “my wallet has been stolen” can be rendered in 
Chinese as wo de pibao bei tou le. Now, wo bei hexie le, or “I have been 
harmonized,” has become a standard quip when censors strike. The role 
of bei in this phrase is important. It signals that I suffered the action; it 
was done to me, and I in no way willed it. This “involuntarily passive” 
implication has led to a range of other sarcastic uses. One is bei xingfu, 
which literally means “happiness-ified.” In the Mao era, it was said that 
the Great Leader mou xingfu (sought happiness) for the people; to be on 
the receiving end of this search, then as now, is to be bei xingfu. We look 
at the officials who “represent” us and see ourselves as bei daibiao or 
“undergoing representation.” In each case, the point is that the “esteemed 
country” acts upon the “fart people,” not the other way around.
Guiguo, pimin, bei hexie, and other terms of this kind have powerful im-
plications. They imply that the twenty-first-century answer to the question 
“What is it to be Chinese?” does not have to be the formula “China equals 
the CCP,” and that there is a terrain upon which people can explore alterna-
tive answers to questions of identity. Terms that suggest other ideas—ones 
that contain min or “people,” for example—are becoming more salient. 
“Fart people” or pimin is sarcastic and as such provides no concept with 
which people will identify for long. But another word containing min is 
gongmin (citizen), and it too has been spreading on the Internet. Gongmin 
is dignified. Like pimin it establishes a distance between the citizen and 
the party-state; but unlike pimin, it can be the basis of a new concept of 
national identity. Gongmin are people who have quan (rights).
Talk on the Internet of rights of various kinds—the “right to know,” 
the “right to express,” the “right to monitor [officialdom],” and oth-
ers—has been steadily increasing in recent years. In September 2011, a 
Tsinghua University law student named Li Yan—frustrated by the rejec-
tion of her repeated requests for research information on several govern-
ment ministries—filed a lawsuit against the authorities on the basis of 
her “right to know.”4 For months after the July 2011 collision of two 
high-speed trains in Zhejiang Province, netizens citing the same “right 
to know” flooded the Railways Ministry with demands that it publicly 
list the victims. In October 2012, a Google search for the combination 
of the phrases “right to know” and “high-speed train” produced 13.5 
million results (just a year ago, the same search had generated 3.75 mil-
lion results). From such figures we can glean an indication of how many 
people were concerned by the issue and how fast such language spreads. 
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The opening of space on the Internet for expression of authentic pub-
lic opinion along with the use of that opinion to bring pressure to bear 
on the state-run media and on decision makers, has already become an 
established pattern in China. It is unlikely that it can be dislodged. A 
number of events in 2011 alone—the Guo Meimei Red Cross scandal, 
the crushing to death of toddler Wang Yue,5 waves of netizens mak-
ing the journey to visit blind activist Chen Guangcheng at his home in 
Shandong Province,6 and others—show how the mechanisms by which 
people can be heard and can exert pressure are not only in place but 
almost regular and predictable. 
It is important to note as well that netizens who embrace the new 
online language also appear to embrace the political values of democ-
racy, human rights, and freedom of expression. These netizens, with 
their growing numbers, expanding social networks, and increasing in-
fluence, seem to be evolving from “voices under domination” to “net-
worked agents of change.” The government’s efforts to control online 
information, the implications and limitations of such control, and the 
capacity of Chinese netizens to advance free speech and facilitate po-
litical mobilization remain matters that are crucial to an adequate un-
derstanding of China. Are new forms of networked communication 
enhancing opportunities for social change and helping to move China 
toward a “threshold” for political transformation? Our study of the rise 
of a new Internet political discourse suggests that such possibilities are 
indeed increasing. 
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